153 ARTICLE INTERNATIONAL LAW RAISON D’ETRE AND THE GROUNDS FOR THE INTERPRETIVE APPROACH By Gianluigi Palombella Author PHD (Law), cum laude, Scuola Superiore di Pisa,1980 Full Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Parma and Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari 'Sant'Anna' di Pisa E-mail: g.palombella@sssup.it Abstract In constitutional States, principles are of different kinds. <...> Some are of procedural nature or point to the functioning of law (‘how’), some others encapsulate the raison d’etre, purpose and value (‘what’ and ‘why’) of the legal order, as a whole. <...> With regard to the International legal system the second kind of principles remains much disputed upon, although a clarification of such an issue would be of relevance in the development of IL, especially in the adjudicative sphere. <...> One of the obstacles to overcome is certainly the account and narrative that legal positivism has offered of IL. <...> This article shall explain, on the one hand, some weaknesses of traditional positivism, with particular concern for the transformation and interweaving of legalities in the supranational sphere. <...> On the other hand, it shall appraise especially the contribution by the late Ronald Dworkin to IL, and how his interpretive theory of law can be projected onto the international environment. <...> Eventually, recent cases before international Courts shall be considered, that expose the way judicial reasoning actually profits from asking questions of principles. <...> Volume 1 December 2014 Issue 2 www.kulawr.ru 154 KUTAFIN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. <...> Re-setting the Scene in the Supranational Domain . 154 2. <...> Dworkin’s Posthumous Work on a Theory of International Law . 164 4. <...> Re-setting the Scene in the Supranational Domain 1.1. <...> It infl uences both the interpretive endeavours of courts and legal theory advancements. <...> This change channeled the posited law through substantive and procedural principles that have become the criteria of recognition, validity and constitutional legitimacy of ordinary legislation. <...> Principles do not only fi ll the legal gaps, but also serve as fundamental means for the interpretation of rules and the enhancement of legal reasoning.2 1 2 JR Silkenat, JE Hickey, PD Barenboim, The Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the Legal State (Rechtsstaat), Springer, Dordrecht 2014. <...> F Raimondo, General Principles <...>