

KANT  
AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS

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KANT  
AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS.

A COMPARISON OF  
CRITICAL AND EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY.

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## P R E F A C E.

IN this work an attempt is made to point out the misconceptions of its real nature that still prevent Kant's theory of knowledge from being estimated on its merits, notwithstanding the large amount of light recently cast upon it, and to show in detail that the *Critique of Pure Reason* raises, and partially solves, a problem that English Empirical Psychology can hardly be said to touch. The general point of view is similar to that of Professor Edward Caird in his *Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*—a work without which mine could not have been written. But, whereas Mr. Caird confines himself almost entirely to a statement and criticism of Kant himself, I devote most attention to the criticisms, direct and indirect, with which Kant has recently been assailed. At the same time, I have thought it advisable to prepare the way for a defence of the Critical theory of knowledge, and for a comparison of it with Empirical Psychology, by a short statement of its main positions, as contained in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* and the corresponding sections of the

*Prolegomena*, together with the *Metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*. Those doctrines receive the fullest treatment which have been the object of recent attack, or which have a close bearing on prevalent modes of thought. To the *Refutation of Idealism*, the principles of *Substance* and *Causality*, and the *Metaphysic of Nature*, in its relations to Mr. Spencer's *First Principles*, a good deal of space is therefore allotted. The negative side of the *Critique*, setting forth the limitations of knowledge, is entered into only so far as seemed necessary to complete the consideration of the positive side, and to exhibit the divergence of the Critical distinction of Phenomena and Noumena from the Spencerian opposition of the Knowable and the Unknowable, to which it bears a superficial resemblance. The direct criticisms which I examine are those of Mr. Balfour, Mr. Sidgwick, and Dr. Hutchison Stirling, all of which rest, as I believe, upon a misapprehension of Kant's theory of knowledge, and lose their apparent force when that theory is properly understood. Minor objections, and objections such as those of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, which recognize the essential distinction of Metaphysic and Psychology, I have not considered. Nor, in examining recent Empirical Philosophy, as the most formidable rival of Critical Idealism, have I thought it necessary to go beyond the typical systems of Mr. Spencer and