Вестник Томского государственного университета. Философия. Социология. Политология №4 2016

Keywords: the pragmatic notion of truth, the dynamics of belief, rationality. 1. <...> Its point will be that the pragmatic theory of truth is not an appendix to the correspondence theory of truth, but an independent account on an equal footing. <...> The pragmatic theory clearly requires a rational account of the dynamics of belief. <...> These principles substantiate the pragmatic theory of truth. <...> It says: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.” This is the famous correspondence theory, which says that truth is assigned to our thoughts, beliefs, or claims if they agree with the facts. <...> After the correspondence theory remained pupated for two thousand years, it was first turned into a proper theoretical enterprise by Tarski’s semantic theory of truth. <...> The core deficit of all those variants of the correspondence theory of truth is their complete epistemological barrenness. <...> Therefore, one might say that the correspondence theory grasps truth from an ontological or third person perspective. <...> When I seek epistemological advice from truth theories, I look for a truth theory from the epistemological or first person perspective. <...> External views on us are healthy, but in the end the first person perspective is not an individual one, but the collective perspective of humanity. <...> There is another theory, still older than the logical positivists, namely Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatic theory of truth. <...> His still shorter slogan was: the ideal theory must be true – where the ideal theory is the one reached in that counterfactual limit of inquiry.1 So far, so good. <...> If we want to understand the limit of inquiry, we need to understand our motion approaching that limit, that is, the dynamics of our belief or judgment formation, indeed the rational dynamics how it ought to rationally move, and not the actual dynamics with all its a- and irrational influences and restrictions such as forgetfulness, stubbornness, etc. <...> Early philosophy of science with its emphasis on confirmation or corroboration, i.e., on the context of justification and its neglect of the context of discovery had quite a static <...>