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Книга пятая



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Russian Society and Challenges of The Time

Book Five

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SUMMARY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL MEGAPROJECT (Instead of Conclusion)

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Foreword

Dear reader, you are about to read book five of the publishing series of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IS RAS), which completes the three-year project of the Russian Science Foundation (RSF)¹ carried out by the Institute's research group in 2014-2016. The four books published earlier² were devoted to analyzing the results of the intermediary stages of the present project obtained in the course of nationwide sociological studies of monitoring type performed at an interval of six months (fall 2014, spring and fall 2015, spring 2016). The empirical basis of this edition was made by the results of the fifth wave of IS RAS monitoring (fall 2016) and the data of previous waves, which made it possible to reveal a generalized image of the state and dynamics of Russian society in crises conditions. At the same time, the methodology and techniques of all the sociological monitoring waves were based on the application of complex and contextual approaches to the study of social phenomena and processes subject to qualitative and quantitative changes that take place under the influence of internal and external factors.

Of course, there is a question here: what defined this scientific strategy adopted by the IS RAS research group? It was first of all the fact that present-day social dynamics and the complication of social life set higher requirements for sociological knowledge of a complex, multifaceted nature. This mainly related to overall analysis and explanation of the state

¹ RNF project No. 14-28-00218 «The dynamics of social transformation of modern Russia's socioeconomic, political, sociocultural and ethnoreligious contexts».

² The project's intermediate findings can be found here: 1) Rossiiskoe obschestvo i vyzovy vremeni. Kniga 1 / Pod. red. M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov [Russian society and challenges of the time. Book one / M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov – editors] Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2015; 2) Rossiiskoe obschestvo i vyzovy vremeni. Kniga 2 / Pod. red. M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov [Russian society and challenges of the time. Book two / M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov – editors] Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2015; 3) Rossiiskoe obschestvo i vyzovy vremeni. Kniga 3. Pod red. M.K. Gorshkov, N.E. Tikhonova [Russian society and challenges of the time. Book three / M.K. Gorshkov, N.E. Tikhonova – editors]. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2016; 4) Rossiiskoe obschestvo i vyzovy vremeni. Kniga 4 / Pod. red. M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov [Russian society and challenges of the time. Book four / M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov – editors] Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2016.

and trends of development as separate spheres of life in society and social changes taking place in it as a whole. This problem is especially relevant in the context of studying a Russian society that has been going through contradictory transformation processes for many decades and is still resolving the question of choosing the vector of its development.

As we know, complex studies of social transformations occurring in societies of different types, which presuppose and are aimed at accounting for multifaceted influences and mutual impacts, have regularly served as the subject of study in different spheres of social and humanitarian knowledge in recent years. However, they are mostly focused on inclusiveness and application of a normative and comparative approach. It is no accident that the best-known and recognized research-and-analytical and academic studies are those that offer not only and not so much the data that characterizes the current state of affairs, but a wide slate of facts and explanatory schemes which take into account the total of conditions that define the specific nature of social changes on the whole and in separate aspects – from civilizational and value-based ones to economic and political ones. However, considering the fact that comparative projects make it possible to see the general and the specific in the studied processes and shed light on specific parameters, key features, and the results of what is going on in particular conditions, they usually do not record the «peculiarity of the moment» that creates the possibility to establish the «living face» of each separate studied society.

Turning to comprehensive studies of social transformations in global science, we should not only emphasize the choice of optimal political strategies and practices as their dominant theme, but also declare the necessity of broad consideration of the issue. Considering the possibilities of combining theoretical interpretation of sociopolitical transformations with the use of sociological monitoring as the organizational-and-methodological and analytical basis of their study, we should note as the most significant projects the ones carried out under the guidance of R. Inglehart as part of the World Values Survey³.

³ *Inglehart R.* Modernizatsiya i demokratiya // Demokratoya i modernizatsiya: k diskussii o vyzovakh XXI veka/ pod. red. V.L. Inozemtsev [Modernization and Democracy //Democracy and Modernization: Toward Discussion on the Challenges of the 21st Century / Ed. by V.L. Inozemtsev]. Moscow: Europa, 2010; *Inglehart R.F.* Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997; *Inglehart R.F., Norris P.* Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; *Inglehart R.F., Norris P.* Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; *Inglehart R.F., Norris P.* Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World. Cambridge:

Regarding the correlation between economic, social, political, ethnic, religious and cultural indicators, the European Social Survey is of methodological and theoretical interest as it allows us to define interconnections between changes that take place in social and political institutions, orientations and beliefs, and also in the dynamics of values and behavior in European communities and Russia on the basis of mass surveys conducted in European countries using the method of S. Schwartz. In the details of this project, a number of works are singled out that are directly devoted to changes taking place in Russian society⁴. However, during the study of identification processes and trends recorded as part of national and European sociopolitical spaces, emphasis is laid more on the specific nature of a value system than interconnection and mutual dependence of different contexts of transformation processes in Russia.

Considering the above, we should note the availability of comprehensive interdisciplinary works in the Russian social and humanitarian field devoted to the analysis of social transformations taking place in Russia and interpretation of peculiarities of the processes taking place in it. During the 2000s, studies of social transformations in the Russian Federation in sociology, political science, and the socioeconomic field that were carried out through the prism of identity parameters, possibilities and the specific nature of modernization processes, and elaboration of trends for effective state policy were systematically conducted by research groups of IS RAS⁵.

Cambridge University Press, 2009; *Welzel C., Inglehart R.F.* Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

⁴ Rossiya v Evrope: po materialam mezhdunarodnogo sociologicheskigo proekta «Ebropeiskoe sotsialnoe issledovanie» / Pod. obshei redaktsiei A.V. Andreenkovi i L.A. Belyaevoi [Russia in Europe: according to materials of the international sociological project «European Social Study/ ed. by A.V. Andreenkova, L.A. Belyaeva] M.: Academia, 2009; Lapin N.I. Sveryaem chelovecheskie izmereniya mpodrnizatsii (po rezultatam tretiei volny Evropeiskogo sotsialnogo issledovaniya, 2006) // Mir Rossii: Sotsiologiya. Etnologiya. [Let's reconcile human dimensions of modernization (following the results of the third wave of the European Social Survey, 2006) // World of Russia. Sociology. Ethnology] 2011. № 2. C. 33–73 [pp.33–73]; Schwartz S., Butenko T.P., Sedova D.S., Lipatova A.S. Utochnennaya teoriya bazovykh individualnykh tsennostei: primeneniye v Rossii// Psikhologiya: Zhurnal Vyssei shkoly ekonomiki [Adjusted Theory of basic individual values: application in Russia // Psychology. Journal of the Higher School of Economics]. 2012. T. 9. № 2. C. 43–70 [pp.43–70]

⁵ Rossiskaya identichnost v usloviyakh transformatsii: opyt sociologicheskogo analiza [Russian identity in the conditions of transformation: experience of sociological analysis] / Ed. By M.K. Gorshkov, N.E. Tikhonova. Moscow: Nauka, 2005; Gotovo li rossiysskoye obschestvo k modernizatsii [Is Russian society ready for modernization] / Ed. by M.K. Gorshkov, R. Krumm, N.E. Tikhonova. M.: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2010; Dvadtset

If we consider different aspects of social transformations of Russian society, we may observe an evident shift to inclusion of sociocultural variables in the analysis field which induce specific political, institutional and value-based correlations⁶.

Thus, analysis of the conducted research shows attempts in social and humanitarian reflection to interpret a wide range of modern trends associated with the problem of studying the reasons and conditions for social transformations. At the same time, they display a lack of a *multifaceted contextual analytical approach*, which can combine theoretical-and-conceptual and practically oriented research work to determine peculiarities of national social transformations with establishment of qualitative and quantitative parameters of the state and dynamics of Russian society using the «here and now» principle. However, it is the objectives – constantly updated data on the real influence of socioeconomic, political, sociocultural, ethnoreligious factors on the nature, features and direction of social transformations in the country, including their mutual dependence – which are the most important prerequisite and inseparable condition of successful solving of relevant problems of elaborating effective state policy aimed at systemic modernization of society, ensuring its social and civic consolidation. All this compelled the research group of IS RAS to carry out a large-scale sociological project aimed at studying the state and dynamics of a Russian society that is experiencing the simultaneous influence of transformation processes and crisis conditions in everyday life⁷. This is a study based on

let reform glazami rossiyan: opyt mnogoletnikh sotsiologicheskikh zamerov [Experience of many years of sociological measurements] / Ed. by M.K. Gorshkov, R. Krumm and V.V. Petukhov. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2011; *L.M. Drobizheva*. Etnichnost v socialno-politicheskom prostranstve Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Opyt 20 let. [Ethnicity in the sociopolitical space of the Russian Federation. Experience of 20 years]. Moscow: Novy Khronograf, 2013; *Grazhdanskaya, etnicheskaya i regionalnaya identichnost: vchera, segodnya, zavtra* [Civil, ethnic and regional identity: yesterday, today, tomorrow] / Ed. by L.M. Drobizheva. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia, 2013; *O chem mechtayut rossiiane* [What Russians dream about: ideal and reality] / Ed. by M.K. Gorshkov, R. Krumm, N.E. Tikhonova. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2013; *Gorshkov M.K. Rossiskoe obschestvo kak ono est (opyt sociologicheskoi diagnostiki)* [Russian society as it is: (experience of sociological diagnostics)]. In vol. 2, 2nd ed. Moscow: Novy Khronograf, 2016.

⁶ V.G. Fedotova, *V.A. Kolpakov, N.N. Fedotova*. Globalny kapitalizm: tri velikie transformatsii. Socialno-filosofskii analiz vzaimootnoshenii ekonomiki i obschestva [Global Capitalism: Three grand transformations. Social and philosophical analysis of relations between the economy and society]. Moscow: Cultural Revolution Publishers, 2008; *Zhiznennyi mir rossiyan: 25 let spustya (konets 1980- seredina 2010-kh gg.)* [World of Russians' Lives: 25 years later (late 1980s – mid 2010s)] / Ed. by Zh.T. Toshchenko. Moscow: TsSPiM, 2016.

⁷ The three-year monitoring program of IS RAS has been prepared and carried out by the institute's research group composed of: M.K. Gorshkov (head), V.V. Petukhov (deputy

an interdisciplinary, complex approach to the analysis of socioeconomic, political, sociocultural and ethnoreligious processes that takes into account the true (representative, adequate) reality represented by the monitoring-type empirical base.

As in previous studies, the total sample size for the fifth wave of monitoring, completed in October 2016, was 4,000 respondents who represent the adult population of Russia (aged 18 and older) and are grouped by gender, age cohort, education level, and type of city/town.

The representativeness of sociological information was ensured by the use of a multi-stage model of regionalization sampling with quota selection of units of observation (respondents) at the last stage. At the first stage, sampling was carried out by the regionalization of territorial economic regions of the Russian Federation in accordance with guidelines developed and applied by Rosstat for monitoring socioeconomic indicators by trend.

The second stage of the sampling includes the selection of typical subjects of the Russian Federation within each territorial and economic region. The regionalization structure comprises two megalopolises and 19 other constituent subjects of the Russian Federation.

Megalopolises: Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Territorial and economic regions:

1. Northern Region – Arkhangelsk Region.
2. Northwestern Region – Novgorod Region.
3. Central Region – Moscow Region, Ryazan Region, Yaroslavl Region, Tula Region.
4. Volga-Vyatka Region – Nizhny Novgorod Region.
5. Central Black Earth Region – Voronezh Region.
6. Volga Region – Republic of Tatarstan, Saratov Region.
7. North Caucasus Region – Rostov Region, Stavropol Territory, North Ossetia.
8. Ural Region – Sverdlovsk Region, Chelyabinsk Region.
9. West Siberian Region – Kemerovo Region, Novosibirsk Region.
10. East-Siberian Region – Krasnoyarsk Territory, Irkutsk Region.
11. Far Eastern Region – Khabarovsk Territory.
12. Republic of Crimea.

head), I.O. Tyurina (coordinator), A.L. Andreev, V.A. Anikin, E.M. Arutyunova, R.E. Barash, L.G. Byzov, Yu.A. Gavrilov, L.M. Drobizheva, A.V. Karavay, E.N. Kofanova, I.M. Kuznetsov, Yu.V. Latov, N.V. Latova, Yu.P. Lezhnina, S.V. Mareeva, M.M. Mchedlova, E.I. Pakhomova, R.V. Petukhov, N.N. Sedova, E.D. Slobodenyuk, I.N. Trofimova, N.E. Tikhonova, A.G. Shevchenko, F.E. Sheregi (selection, primary statistical processing of information).

The *third stage* featured further regionalization within the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, i.e. the division into 5 types of communities based on the statistical quotas by degree of urbanization: megalopolises; administrative centers of constituent entities of the Russian Federation; district administrative centers; urban type settlements; villages.

At the *fourth stage* was sampling, i.e. direct selection of respondents for the survey by interviewers at set quotas. The quotas were mainly observed by major socio-professional indicators of the respondents⁸ and ages grouped into five age cohorts: 18–30 years; 31–40 years; 41–50 years; 51–60 years; 60 years and older.

The nationwide study (fifth wave) and preparation of materials for the present scientific monograph were undertaken by a working group composed of: M.K. Gorshkov (head of the study, foreword, conclusion, general editing), A.L. Andreev (Chapter 6), R.E. Barash (Chapter 12), L.G. Byzova (Chapter 11), L.M. Drobizheva (Chapter 13), A.V. Karavay (Chapter 2), Y.V. Latova (Chapters 5, 15), N.V. Latova (Chapter 4), Y.P. Lezhnina (Chapter 3), S.V. Mareeva (Chapter 1), M.M. Mchedlova (Chapter 14), V.V. Petukhov (deputy head of the study, Chapters 7, 16, general editing), R.V. Petukhov (Chapter 9), N.N. Sedova (Chapter 10), N.E. Tikhonova (Chapter 2), I.N. Trofimova (Chapter 8). Scientific editor – *N. Niks*.

⁸ At the stage of quota selection, an equal share of quotas is observed for the following socio-professional criteria: 1 – working industries, construction, mines without higher education; 2 – engineers in industry, construction, mines with higher education; 3 – employees in trade, catering, services, transportation, public utilities with comprehensive education (or less), primary and secondary vocational education; 4 – employees of financial and insurance companies, trade, services, transportation, utilities with higher education; 5 – workers (employees) of universities, schools, healthcare, management (administrative, political), science, art, media, higher education; 6 – employees (technicians, operators, librarians, secretaries, nurses, and others) of universities, schools, healthcare, management (administrative, political), science, media, comprehensive or secondary vocational education; 7 – military, Ministry of Internal Affairs workers, customs, tax services with any education; 8 – students of secondary and higher education institutions; 9 – inhabitants of villages and settlements.

Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion)

Considering that the fifth wave of IS RAS monitoring completed the three-year research period of the RNF project, it would be appropriate not only to present the main conclusions based on the results obtained in the course of its realization but also address the conclusions of a contextual and general nature that reveal the distinctive features of Russian society that manifested themselves in 2014–2016.

As shown by results of the **first wave of monitoring** (*October 2014*), the basic factors underlying the functioning of modern Russian society have not undergone either any considerable transformations or any situational changes at the start of the crisis that could have disrupted the overall community lifestyle, produced a decadent mass mentality, or provoked widespread protests and public distrust towards state institutions. On the contrary, the desire of a number of leading Western countries to «punish» Russia for its reunification with Crimea, with the support of the Russian-speaking population in southeast Ukraine, caused a rise in society of a patriotism, and even to some extent consolidation of ideologically opposing social groups and political movements of Russian citizens. As for the *context of the present time*, the survey revealed the following key characteristics and indicators:

- regardless of all the gravity and criticism with which the situation in the country is being evaluated, the state of Russians' social well-being has not fallen below the parameters characteristic of the previously observed periods of social stabilization and destabilization;
- the conflicting judgments that the people widely used to identify the problems in everyday life turned out to be mainly linked to understanding the co-dependence between the internal and external factors mediating the nature of the social environment;
- mass consciousness underwent a change of priorities that touched upon evaluation of the main sources of threats for Russia: while in 2013 internal threats were dominating in the eyes of our fellow citizens, the focus of public attention shifted to external threats in the fall of 2014;

- in Russians' opinion, all the events and processes that could present a potential danger to the country were joined together by a single link, i.e. the Ukrainian crisis: Russia's forced involvement in the situation, as well as NATO's eastward expansion and the related rise in international tension, had begun to form, according to Russian citizens, the basis for the agenda reflecting the most dangerous trends;
- the attitude of various segments of the population to Western sanctions against Russia was restrained and was predetermined by the respondents' habitual lifestyle and established level of consumption. At the same time, the willingness of society to economize and the public's support of measures intended to strengthen Russia was quite high.

In general, as shown by the survey in the fall of 2014, the specific socioeconomic, spiritual, and psychological capabilities of Russian society that had emerged in the previous decade largely contributed to the mass population segments' reserved attitude to the new reality, which mitigated the acuteness of arising problems.

The second wave of monitoring (*March 2015*) was aimed at studying the consequences of the most acute phase of the economic crisis in the context of analyzing everyday life of Russian citizens. The obtained data made it clear that in the fall of 2014, the mindset of Russians and their attitude towards authority were mostly defined by an external political agenda, and by the spring of 2015, the nature of their perception of the situation in the country started to change, though not materially so. These changes were prompted by the economic crisis as well as by the first impacts of the sanctions imposed against Russia and the anti-Western countersanctions on its part. Even though the numerous predictions of foreign experts that the country were to enter mid-2015 in a state of economic collapse and social depression did not come true, overall anxiety did intensify.

In the conditions of the current (in the same way as the previous) economic crisis, the most widespread form of its impact on the everyday lives of Russians was an increase in prices that involved a larger part of the country's population than the one that occurred in 2008-2009, and was comparable by the degree of pain to the situation of 1998-1999. While in the spring of 2015, the problem of rising prices was seen more acutely by our fellow citizens than in the past, difficulties at work involved a relatively smaller part of them than six years ago. Even so, between the fall of 2014 and the spring of 2015, the fear of unemployment counted among the key

«sore spots» of Russian society. Given the low rate of dismissals and real unemployment, this fear was most likely of a socio-psychological nature and could be explained, on the one hand, by the sheer dread of being left with no means of livelihood and minimal unemployment benefits and, on the other hand, the fact that the majority of Russians lack the necessary savings that would make it possible to make ends meet until another job is found.

It has also been revealed that representatives of various professional groups employ different strategies when adapting to new living conditions, in particular when diversifying their income. For example, one-time jobs – the practice of adapting to the hardships of life that «overtakes» a second job in this respect, which is traditionally popular and widespread in different professional communities – turned out to be more typical of manual workers in the crisis conditions. At the same time, white-collar workers with a higher education started to resort to finding a second job more often than the representatives of other groups.

As the social and sociopolitical situation in the country was quite tense in the spring of 2015, Russians felt more anxious than ever. The shifts that were revealed in the mental and emotional state of the population were driven by the vast majority, which felt either calm and composed or anxious and tense, while barely affecting those who perceive almost all the social situations in the country through the prism of «catastrophic consciousness». At the same time, there were no signs of panic in the social «niches» against this background. The crisis phase from October 2014 to March 2015 did not reach the depths that could have triggered additional social tension, ready to turn into real protest sentiments and actions. Moreover, national consolidation and the mass surge of patriotism, noted above, that were brought about by the anti-Russian sanctions and the conduct of the Western political leaders during the celebrations dedicated to the 70th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War, as well as the relatively mild losses in the crisis period, resulted in different population groups beginning to display signs of new cultural patterns aimed at the mobilization of national resources.

It was established during the second stage of research that Russian society entered a new loop of crisis with well-established zones of institutional trust and mistrust. The zone of trust was formed by the institutions that are perceived by Russians as caring for general well-being and are associated with the ideas of integrity, unity, stability, and security. Russians tend to link these concepts to the presidency, the army, and the Church. The zone of mistrust was formed by the institutions associated in the mass consciousness with pursuing private (group,

territorial, industrial, party) interests. Interestingly enough, the level of trust in the institutions that form the middle zone is the most unstable, being strongly influenced by current events and processes.

The choice to trust the baseline state institutions makes it possible to say that the institutional trust existing in Russian society is not only hierarchical but also holistic, which to a certain degree «compensates» for its uneven distribution among the population. A lower level of trust in most state institutions is primarily observed among the socially active and resource-endowed groups of our fellow countrymen, such as the young and wealthy, self-sufficient Russians.

The results yielded during the second stage of the project have also allowed us to evaluate the current state of civic activism in Russia; we had reason to believe that, despite the crises period, civic activism has solid growth potential, primarily due to it becoming more and more subjective. The main «bearers» of civic activism are people with an active stance on their own being and future, and with a range of diverse ambitions in different spheres (especially concerning education, self-fulfillment, social communication). These people are inclined towards non-conformity, initiative, and enterprise, and readiness to fight for their rights and to change their surroundings for the better.

At the same time, data from the survey conducted in the spring of 2015 showed that the level of real political involvement of Russian citizens was not practically growing regardless of aggravation or some attenuation of signs of crisis. Just as in previous years, it reached no more than 1%. It is important in this context to consider the level of social activism of youth aged 18 to 30, which exceeds similar indicators of other age cohorts: 16% of young Russians representing this age group confirmed that they are members of Internet communities, while 7% said they take part in volunteer campaigns, and two 4% groups said that they contribute to environmental and charitable organizations, respectively.

The study has reaffirmed the established truth: despite the crisis, the previously formed prerequisites for the development of important public trends are still going strong, even in difficult social and economic conditions. Russia is opening a wide range of possibilities for civic self-organization based on Internet communication. Due to growing access to the Internet, civic activists are capable of creating a network of multiple resources aimed at the development of grassroots solidarity practices. Authorities of different levels are using the mechanisms of «electronic democracy» more and more actively, initiating the creation of different platforms for civic activity and direct communication with the public. There is also a certain correlation between Russians' involvement in

different communication channels, on the one hand, and their life strategies and social and political practices.

And finally, as convincingly demonstrated by the results of the second wave of our sociological monitoring, Russian society has been dynamically (from a historical point of view) moving towards a modern consumer society, where the population's dependence on the government is being gradually reduced, while personal and individual interests start prevailing over the public ones. Thus, over the four-year period, the share of those in absolute need of state support fell from 66% to 56% (2011 and spring 2015 data, respectively). At the same time, we see a 10% increase in the number of Russians who rely on their own efforts (34% versus 44%, respectively).

As could have been expected, this self-sufficient part of society is mainly comprised of the young and wealthy Russian citizens, in addition to those characterized by having a definite set of achievable life goals and striving for self-fulfillment. This is probably the main reason behind the positive social and psychological mood of those Russians who can solve their problems without state support.

The desire to be self-sufficient has no direct connection with opposing the state. This is expressed even by those respondents who work for the state on a professional basis (military personnel, civil servants, employees of law enforcement agencies, etc.). In this case, the sociological analysis has identified, despite the crisis conditions, a significant advance, rather than the completion, of society's adaptation to the economic and political reality of present-day Russia, and has helped reveal an emerging new subject of economic and sociopolitical action, which, in the circumstances under consideration, is capable of moving to the forefront of public life's key events and processes.

The third wave of monitoring was carried out in *October 2015*. Its results showed that by the end of 2015, the tension in mass consciousness and sensitivity of citizens to the factors threatening the country were still high. The population still perceived an outside enemy as the main negative force at hand and the target of all potential blame; society has adapted to economic adversity by falling back on the familiar formula, «Anything but war». Judging by the «hot spots» of international conflict, this formula could be considered quite significant.

As for the population's economic status, it froze at a stable, low level in 2015. While the average individual and household income did not drop (and even increased slightly) during the crisis year, this growth failed to counteract the effects of inflation. In addition, income dynamics were different across various income groups: during the past year, the average

income in the lower decile did not decrease, while the average income in the upper decile fell. This, at least in part, helped mitigate excessive income inequality, which was confirmed by statistical and sociological data as well. At the same time, the financial status of respondents from the two upper deciles still remained drastically different from that of the rest of the population, even with the negative income dynamics in mind. As a result, the more affluent population groups were not as likely to state that they had been affected either by the crisis in general or by its most widespread forms, in particular, linked to a higher cost of living and lower income. Such reaction occurred because the economic well-being of their representatives is driven not only by their current income (as is the case with less well-off Russians) but also by a more general range of opportunities and resources, which allows them to mitigate the negative influence of economic crises on their lifestyle.

The crisis continued to impact the majority of the Russian population, mainly through the considerable increase in prices that accompanied it. At the same time, comparative analysis of sociological research results has let us conclude that the current crisis affected the Russian population in a far less painful way than the 2009 crisis. This was manifested by a lower outreach of structural problems connected to the labor market, as well as by the way the public evaluated the damage done to them by the crisis. It was most often characterized as serious, but not catastrophic.

Such definitions may also be explained, in particular, by the fact that living through a year-long economic recession did not bring about any changes related to a qualitative deterioration of Russian citizens' financial «safety buffer». Such factors as owning property and real estate, indicators related to having savings and credit, and the types of Russians' main income sources overall remained fairly stable. On the other hand, this «safety buffer» had not been too resilient even during the years before the crisis, which were characterized by fairly sustainable social and economic development; and quite naturally, it did not grow any stronger during the crisis.

As highlighted by our study, the optimization of losses during the crisis proved to be most challenging for the employed population of Russia's rural areas. Throughout the past year, worker dismissals in villages became widespread; employable members of one in every seven rural households had trouble finding stable jobs. As a result, an overwhelming majority of the rural labor force started working overtime, while payment for such work became far less frequent. The practice of relying on household gardens or farms has mostly been abandoned in Russian villages. In any case, even after a year-long crisis, accompanied

by increasing rates of rural unemployment, household gardens or farms remained among one of the key sources of financial support for less than 40% of village families, while selling home-grown farm produce was a common practice for just a small percentage of rural households. This allows us to conclude that Russian rural areas are becoming dominated by the urbanized model of employment.

The current crisis has brought focus to the problem of resource availability to the Russian population. People with access to a large range of resources had a sizable «safety buffer» at the start of the crisis and consequently experienced the smallest financial loss, even though their actual income level dropped more dramatically than that of other groups. However, this does not mean that they had fewer problems. The point here is that the impact of the crisis on the high-resource group of Russians turned out to be far more complex and multifaceted. The forms of this impact include not only the rising prices and falling income (the main source of problems for the rest of the population) but also changes in the working environment that involved many of them. And even though this group's «safety buffer», which includes professional qualifications and social resources, has so far allowed its members to negate the adverse effects that the economic crisis had on their standard of living, this does not mean that the high-resource group is doing absolutely fine. On the contrary, it is this large, financially well-off group of the Russian population, which mostly resides in the two megalopolises, that has turned out to be the only one to become affected (and quite adversely) by the crisis not so much in terms of the quality of life as in terms of one's customary lifestyle.

Low-resource groups of Russians, in turn, have suffered from the crisis more than the average Russian, even despite surpassing all other groups as far as nominal income growth is concerned. First, the lack of not only economic but also any other resources that may boost a person's resilience to crises in today's Russia left them without means to compensate for the drop in their actual income. Second, due to the low quality of human capital, these groups were the first to suffer the consequences of negative changes in the labor market by losing their work income. Third, the complete absence or low quality of social resources has not allowed the low-resource population groups to cope with the crisis with the help of their own social networks.

As revealed by the third wave results of the IS RAS monitoring, the economic crisis has worsened the issue of Russians' mass perception of inequality: in the fall of 2015, only 3% of the respondents agreed with the statement that Russia does not suffer from deep social inequality,

while 9% claimed that they had never been affected by any type of social inequality. As we analyzed the dynamics of perception of the kinds of inequality typical of Russian society, our studies revealed that over the past two years, people have been noting a sharp rise in their severity. Out of the above, the issue that Russians currently consider to be most painful is income inequality (which is hardly surprising, given that income inequality in modern Russia not only presents a significant problem on its own but also serves as a driving force behind a whole range of additional types of non-financial inequality that many people suffer from).

The crisis year has not failed to affect the well-being of various social categories, in particular, the middle class and the poor. In fact, the next stage of monitoring has shown that during the 2014-2015 crisis, the number of the poor in Russia doubled when compared to the years before the crisis (2012-2013), amounting to as much as a quarter of the total population in the fall of 2015.

As part of the **fourth wave of the project** (*March 2016*), the research strategy was aimed at detection of relatively well-established features of Russian society that characterize the everyday practices of our fellow citizens in the context of a continuing crisis, not only in the socioeconomic sphere but in other spheres of life as well.

Considering that the immanent characteristic of any kind of human activity is the psychoemotional component, it was important to evaluate the social and psychological dynamics of Russian society in the crisis period. The obtained data showed that after a slight improvement in the common estimates of the situation in Russia at the end of 2015, spring 2016 was marked by a new surge of widespread anxiety. The number of Russians describing the situation as «tense» rose, while the number of those who believed that everything was under control fell. At the same time, there were no changes in the share of dire pessimists, apologists of catastrophic consciousness who are inclined to treat every situation in the country as something little short of an apocalypse (8-9%). Overall, as was shown by the results of previous waves of monitoring, the 2014 crisis was highly reminiscent of the 2008 crisis, although in a less tense, more “watered down» version: we could observe *gradual rising of tension in the country, but at a slightly slower pace*.

It should be noted that evaluation of the domestic environment in Russia as of spring 2016 corresponds to evaluation of the most recent period. While in the fall of 2015, Russians’ public consciousness exhibited a certain rise in optimism driven by certain social and economic stabilization, it became evident in the six months to follow that stabilization had only been temporary, and as the latest negative

dynamics of exchange rates brought about a further increase in prices, society once again had to re-evaluate its achievements. Consequently, a poorer general estimate of the changes that had occurred in the country over the past year was the result of unfulfilled hopes for the crisis to grow less pronounced.

That said, the relatively pessimistic attitude towards the current situation and what the country had to live through a year ago was somewhat mitigated by the people's predictions of Russia's progress in the near future. And even though the share of negative attitudes decreased due to them being replaced by vague opinions like «Nothing will change» (as opposed to rising optimism), the very fact that society's psychological and emotional state is characterized by fewer unequivocally negative predictions allows us to say the following: the population is not growing desperate and continues to hope for the better.

The «safety buffer» that Russians had built up over the years of economic stability allowed them to keep a sustainable balance between a positive and negative social and mental state. However, by the spring of 2016, the crisis had upset the scales, leading to the *dominance of negative social and psychological attitudes (granted, it was slight, but still dominant)*. And even though this shift is incomparable to the attitudes during the 1998 crisis (when negative social and psychological attitudes were expressed by 90% of the population, as opposed to 53% today), it may still be considered a symptom heralding the need to pay closer attention to the current state and dynamics of Russians' opinions.

A sociological test of Russians' overall mental state, operationalized by its indicators, allows us to somewhat smooth over the prevalence of negativity over positivity in society. On the one hand, the data for the spring of 2016 was less positive when compared to the fall of 2015 (i.e., less people felt calm and emotionally uplifted, and the number of those experiencing irritation grew). But on the other hand, there was not that much negativity compared to the data collected throughout 2015. Moreover, the most toxic moods (aggression, bitterness, aggravation) remained at the same level as in 2014. There was only one aspect that saw a significant change for the worse: far more Russians started displaying feelings of indifference, apathy, and depression (here, the figures doubled). That said, even though such attitudes are definitely negative, at least they do not lead to destructive behavior.

The fourth wave results showed that Russians' overall social and psychological inclinations continued to be less than optimistic. The negative characteristics that distinguished it in the fall of 2015 were not just preserved but even slightly intensified: only one-third of

the population responded positively to their environment. More than half of all Russians believed that their loved ones were experiencing negative emotions such as uneasiness, irritation, and resentfulness. More negative estimates of loved ones' social circumstances and state of mind were, first and foremost, observed among the most deprived part of the population, i.e. those in worse financial circumstances and with fewer opportunities to tackle their difficulties on their own, as well as with more reasons to grow bitter if they fail.

If we bring together all available information on Russians' personal social and mental state, as well as on the state of the people around them, we will see that the general picture of society's emotional attitudes is increasingly negative. Other factors (such as evaluation of the domestic situation or the financial status of Russian citizens) also demonstrate that Russians have come to understand that the crisis is severe and likely here to stay. All the same, realizing this does not necessarily mean that the population has resigned itself to this fate. The year 2015, with its relative stability, gave Russians a chance to take a closer look at the situation and to reallocate the resources at their disposal in a way that would help them minimize their losses by (perhaps temporarily) denying themselves the things they could live without and focusing instead of what was vital for their survival.

Given the current turbulence in society, it is quite clear why the key problems concerning Russians are those that directly affect their everyday lives. In the spring of 2016, the vast majority of Russians continued to feel anxious about rising prices for goods and services, rising utility fees, and the diminishing quality of life experienced by a large number of people in the country. The five key challenges faced by Russians also included unemployment and the limited availability of free social services. The rest was not considered by the population to be that important.

It is worth noting that foreign policy issues or the general prospects for society's development are of the least concern to Russians: they are mostly on the mind of the more affluent segments of the population. In turn, personal difficulties linked to material resources are perceived somewhat less painfully in megalopolises and cities with a population over one million, as opposed to all the other types of communities. At the same time, unlike people in other communities, their residents express a relatively higher concern about factors governing the quality and safety of life in big cities.

In the second year, the crisis began to have a substantial impact on Russians' everyday lives, with the majority of the population being affected one way or another. Just like during the initial stage of the crisis,

the people that continued to be affected the most come from highly disadvantaged groups with low income. In these conditions, saving one's income has become the most popular adaptation strategy. In the spring of 2016, only 13% of the population did not start reducing their expenses, either because they did not want to or they felt no need to. The remaining 87% of Russians admitted that the crisis had forced them to change their habitual consumption patterns. Our research reveals that in most cases people started saving on clothes, shoes, food, and vacations. Furthermore, around 40% of Russians also started cutting down on everyday leisure activities and on purchases of costly durable goods.

When faced with a crisis, Russians do not economize solely on consumption; their desire to cut their expenses also had quite a significant impact on the investments in human resources development (i.e. education and healthcare services, meaningful and adequate rest), which may compromise the country's overall talent potential.

It became evident by the end of the second year of the crisis that possible adaptation of employed Russians to the crisis is largely hindered by adverse workplace conditions. In fact, it is one of the main consequences of the current crisis. As was convincingly shown by the results of the third and fourth waves of monitoring, employment problems are expressed in various forms: dismissals followed by unemployment, difficulties with finding new work, the widespread practice of sending workers on unpaid leave and delaying wages, violations of labor laws, including a larger share of "under the table" jobs, etc.

Even though the official unemployment figures for 2014-2016 remain quite modest, the high labor turnover in Russia is now combining with prolonged, stagnant periods of unemployment. In the spring of 2016, one in every two unemployed Russians had been looking for a job for more than six months. This issue is especially relevant for rural communities. While in urban areas, people who had been unemployed for a long time did end up finding work in 80% of cases or more, in rural settlements these figures amounted to less than 50%. It is also essential to add that stagnant unemployment is most typical in the polar opposite age cohorts, i.e. of young people aged 18 to 30 and of people just about to reach the retirement age.

Another fact that merits special attention is the finding that during the second year of the crisis, the number of households that included unemployed senior citizens rose by 15%. Bearing in mind the partial (compared to inflation rates) indexation of retirement payments, this trend leads to a reduction in the quality of life for a large share of the population.

Even though the negative consequences of the crisis related to the aforementioned employment issues are glaringly obvious, from a comprehensive sociological diagnosis point of view, they are not among the key factors determining the nature of the 2014–2016 crisis. The main adverse consequence of the crisis, which the participants of the IS RAS research group agreed on, is the systemic change in the relations between employers and employees, with the focus shifting to the latter becoming even further disenfranchised. What we are dealing with here is not so much employees being deprived of their rights (primarily, the right to hold strikes) as employers failing to respect the rights that, in theory, their workers still possess. Sociological studies show that this failure mostly takes the form of refusing to pay for overtime work or sick and maternity leave, as well as prolonging the work week in a way that violates the law, taking administrative measures to force workers to go on unpaid leave, and reducing the share of wages paid within the legal framework.

On the whole, IS RAS monitoring shows that in 2016 half of Russia's working population was, in one way or another, outside the framework of the labor, retirement, and social legislation of the Russian Federation. The social protection issues mostly concerned employed people living in the so-called «lesser Russia» (villages, urban type settlements, and towns with a population under 100,000). Considering the obtained data, there are reasons to say that the self-professed employers (as well as so-called effective managers) are trying to rebuild the domestic economy and overcome the typical issues of today at the expense of their employees by increasing their workload and jeopardizing their social security at the same time.

Starting the **fifth wave** of this project (*October 2016*), the research team proceeded from the fact that two years had passed since the start of the 2014 crisis. During these years, as was shown by previous sociological measurements, there was still uncertainty in society: until the fall of 2016, there were forecasts that the socioeconomic situation would improve in the current year, and there were just as many opposing ones which said that the country would be taken by a second wave of crisis. However, the results of the survey showed that quite considerable positive changes occurred in the attitudes of Russians by October 2016.

For the first time in the past two years, assessment by the Russian population of the situation in the country approached the baseline characteristics of the beginning of the crisis. The share of those who perceived it as tense and crisis-driven still exceeded half of the population of the Russian Federation (56%), but this indicator almost coincided with the same indicator from October 2014 (53%) and was better than

the value from 2011 (59%). At the same time, we could observe an increase in the share of Russians with positive attitudes. Thus, *Russians* seem to have *adapted to the new economic reality and the crisis started to lose its acuteness and importance*, at least in the mass consciousness.

The evaluation of the current domestic environment in the country corresponds to the evaluation of the past year's changes. In March 2016, another negative change in the currency rate and ensuing rise in prices contributed to more pessimistic evaluations of Russian achievements by the population, but six months later (in October 2016) we could see considerable positive shifts: one-third of the country's population (30%) noted improvement in the situation, while its deterioration was identified by just a little more than one-half of Russians (51% versus 70% in the spring of 2016). Nevertheless, if we compare the obtained image with the one recorded in 2013, it becomes evident that the socioeconomic situation that developed in the country in the fall of 2016 is evaluated by society in a much more critical way than the one that occurred three years ago.

The fifth wave showed a negative perception not only in the state of the economic sphere of societal life but also its moral climate, the nature of international relations, the tendencies of democratic development in it, and the state of affairs in the social sphere. The only exception is fighting terrorism. According to respondents, the positive changes of the past three years in this sphere evidently prevail over the negative ones. There were also positive changes in mass evaluations of the results of fighting corruption by our fellow countrymen.

The survey showed that society maintains a relative balance between the positive and negative social and psychological state. At the start of 2016, the scale began to unbalance: the negative variant of the latter started to prevail among the population (insignificantly, though). Nevertheless, by the end of 2016 balance was restored and the everyday lives of Russian citizens were once again dominated by positive moods. Practically every other respondent declared that he/she felt calm and poised. The share of people with anxiety about the future dropped considerably for a short period from March to October 2016 (from 29% to 23%), and we also recorded no increase in extreme manifestations of social discontent (annoyance, bitterness, and aggression).

One of the important features of mass consciousness is the difference in a person's perception of their own life and what they see around themselves personally or through the media. For many years, Russians perceive their close environment in a considerably more favorable light than everything beyond it. Thus, if 52% of those polled evaluate their

social and psychological state in a positive way, the way the people around them feel is seen as positive by only 34%. But a positive trend is also observed here: six months ago, more than half of Russians noted express negative feelings in the social space that surrounded them (anxiety – 31%, annoyance, bitterness and aggression – 26%), with their share reduced by the end of 2016, although not significantly.

The indicator of the trend toward an improving situation in Russia is changes in respondents' evaluations of social tension in society. It is entirely natural that any crisis reduces the general feeling of comfort in life and leads to growing tension, and this picture could be observed in Russian society in the crisis of 2008–2009. In just those six months, the share of those who felt social tension rose from 59% to 83%. In the period from March 2015 to March 2016, growing tension in society was noted by about 61–64% of the population, which is considerably less than in 2009, but still involves almost two-thirds of the country's population.

However, we could observe positive shifts in this matter by October 2016: the share of those who noted that tension was rising a little or considerably dropped to 52% (the lowest indicator against the backdrop of the past two crises). At the same time, the share of those who have a different opinion nearly doubled (from 12% in March 2016 to 21% in October 2016). At the same time, we could see a constantly rising share of supporters of neutral evaluations who thought that the situation in the country is not changing for the better or for the worse.

The results of the fifth wave of monitoring confirmed that evaluation of the impact of the crisis is tightly connected with material standing, and even to a higher degree with its subjective evaluation: for instance, the share of those who evaluate personal damage done by the crisis as quite considerable was the highest among those who have income below half of the regional median (12%), and also among those who perceive their material standing as bad (15%). A clear relationship was also revealed between evaluation of damage done by the crisis and the general social and psychological state of Russians: among those who evaluated damage from the crisis as catastrophic, 39% experienced fear and concerns regarding the future of the country, while the share of such people among those unaffected by the crisis is just 5%. 82% of those who considered the impact of the crisis to be catastrophic were uncertain about their future, with only a quarter of those practically unaffected by the crisis sharing this view.

Rising prices and a drop in the real income of Russians continued to lead to the fact that saving their income was becoming a widespread strategy of adapting to the new economic conditions. And though in

the fall of 2016, a little more than a quarter of Russians (27%) noted that there was no need for them to start saving as a result of the crisis, changes in economic conditions for the rest still resulted in a change in traditional consumption models in one or several spheres.

The most frequent items for saving included clothes and shoes (53% among the whole population and 72% among those who cut expenses), food (43% and 59%, respectively) and vacations (43% and 59%). At the same time, Russians started to save on vacations and expensive durable goods on a mass scale. The «rating» of items for saving practically has not changed in the past six months: in the spring of 2016, it was also dominated by the purchase of products that can satisfy basic needs (clothes, shoes, and food), followed by items related to vacationing, leisure and durable goods.

The majority of representatives in all income groups of the population were involved in saving. However, its intensity did differ depending on material standing. Absolutely all items of saving were more frequently used by the groups with the worst material standing. On average, their representatives used 3.7 out of 9 possible saving options, while the most favored group used 2.1.

Thus, *saving their income is the dominant strategy of population adaptation to the new crisis reality*. However, it should be taken into account that it has involved the overwhelming majority of Russians to some extent, particularly the least well-off. The question of the possibility for further cutting back on consumption, especially without considerable damage to the human resources of the country's population, remains open. It is telling that those who started to save on something speak more frequently about saving as a potential adaptation strategy (56% of them are ready to continue to cut down on their expenses, if necessary, versus 36% of those that still have not resorted to any economizing).

As for the second most widespread adaptation strategy, the search for additional sources of income, 46% of Russians are hypothetically ready to resort to it. However, it should be taken into account for realistic evaluation of the provided value that in the fall of 2016, a second job was one of the main sources of income for just 4% of the working population, one-time earnings for 14% more, and these shares did not change in 2016. Thus, despite the fact that a considerable share of Russians declare their readiness to adapt to the crisis by searching for additional sources of income, the data on the real situation testifies to the rarity of this adaptation strategy in practice.

Income from property, property rental, and interest on deposits was received by only 3% of the population in the fall of 2016, which also casts

doubt on the possibility to practically apply the strategies declared by them to rent out their property or live on savings made.

We should note the fact that the general rating of the supposed strategies of adaptation to the crisis, as well as shares of the population that choose particular variants of these strategies, practically have not changed over the two years of the crisis. The most noticeable changes (that did not influence the general image) touched upon the strategies of turning to relatives for help: the share of those who did not exclude such options fell from 20% to 16%. This is not surprising, considering that 15% of the population had to start saving on material aid provided earlier.

At the same time, there was an increased share of those who plan to rely on the strategy of self-sustainment with food from a household garden or farm. The data on the main sources of Russians' income testifies to the fact that they actually started to use their household garden or farm more frequently as a result of the crisis: in the fall of 2016, about 20% of the population included it among the main sources, and this share doubled in comparison with the fall of 2014. In case of further deterioration in material standing, the last two strategies were mainly mentioned by representatives of the least well-off population groups. Thus, reducing expenses remained the main adaptation mechanism both according to respondents' statements and in reality.

With all the situational and contextual importance of the provided evaluations and conclusions that characterize Russian society in crisis conditions, they motivate the *reasoning on basic problems of functioning of present-day Russian society*. Moreover, considering their representative verification, they compel us to have a deeper approach to the study of the correlation between, on the one hand, stable and fundamental and, on the other hand, dynamic and changeable constructions of Russian society. In one way or another, analysis of the results of all five waves of monitoring makes it necessary to use sociological diagnostics and address the problems of the everyday priorities of today's Russians, evaluate the models of world perception existing in society, particularly in the paradigms of the traditional and the modern, correlate them with the existing system of regulations and values, and also understand how the ethnic, national and religious characteristics of Russian society fit into the new reality.

If we talk about sociological diagnostics of international relations, it should be emphasized that, despite the crisis in Russian society, many people expressed a generally favorable opinion: 45% of respondents describe inter-ethnic relations across the country as friendly and smooth, 40% as seemingly smooth but internally tense, and 14% as tense and on

the verge of possible conflict. Interestingly enough, when it comes to evaluating inter-ethnic relations in the particular area where they live, Russians' responses prove far more positive. This is quite understandable since respondents evaluate these relations based on their personal experience, while in order to consider inter-ethnic relations in Russia as a whole, they have to rely on the media (mostly television).

The scope of inter-ethnic unity and consolidation is largely influenced by the status of Russians' national identity. The process of its emergence and development, which was boosted in the early 2000s, has yielded positive results, contradicting the logic of economic recession. For instance, IS RAS monitoring shows that between 2013 and 2016 as many as 74–84% of the population experienced a feeling of unity with the rest of their countrymen.

A sustained sense of unity with other Russians, focus on the state's importance, a stable level of trust towards the government and one's fellow citizens – all of these factors essentially reveal the rise of a new type of civic identity. The second decade of the 21st century, and especially the years 2014 and 2015, which were marked by such momentous events as the Sochi Olympics and the return of Crimea, shed light on the fact that Russian society is steadily consolidating.

The sense of unity with other Russians is not expressed too differently across various age cohorts, though it is slightly more pronounced if we look at people over 50 (75–77% compared to 69% of 18- to 30-year-olds). Similarly, solidarity with other Russians is declared by nearly equal shares of people with different education levels. It is also worth adding that those Russians who identify themselves as «people of Russia» express feelings of love towards their country and take reverent pride in its modern achievements far more frequently. At the same time, they are open to cooperation with people of different ethnicities: over 80% of them believe that «the government must nurture the culture of every ethnic group in the country». What is more, the share of people who put their trust in federal authorities (first and foremost, the president and the government) is higher among respondents with a strong sense of civic identity. Thus, the expert opinion that civic identity is a resource that brings Russians together, greatly contributing to boosting their confidence in the future, is confirmed when we analyze Russians' public consciousness.

In these conditions, ethnic solidarity acts as a key social resource, helping bring the community together. It serves Russians as a basis for fostering feelings of patriotism, social optimism, and loyalty towards the country and the government. Despite some expert opinions, for most respondents, solidarity with other people of their ethnicity does not

contradict their sense of identity as Russians in any way; on the contrary, the two identities harmoniously coexist. Among those ethnic Russians who name love as their main feeling towards the country, the share of ethnic solidarity exceeds 80%. For Russians belonging to other ethnic groups, ethnic solidarity is higher in groups who name pride as their main feeling towards Russia.

It is worth noting that, regardless of ethnicity, the feeling of solidarity is lower in groups that experience unease and frustration: the share of people experiencing the feeling of ethnic solidarity drops to 60-65% among respondents who describe their everyday mood as «indifference and apathy».

That is to say, those Russians who support the notion of ethnic solidarity («today every person must feel united with their ethnic community») exhibit a more positive and optimistic view of the country's development, are more loyal to the government and society, love their homeland, and are proud to be Russian. When compared to other groups, ethnic Russians with a strong sense of identity are more inclined to advocate the concept of «Dominion» and feel that they are part of Russia's history and a unified society. This gives us reason to state the following: regardless of actual ethnicity, the feeling of ethnic solidarity strengthens Russians' patriotism and, without exaggeration, bolsters social optimism and mutual understanding.

The data collected during IS RAS monitoring gives us reason to conclude that religious affiliation does not play a major role in perceiving the sources of social threats, thus reaffirming the followers of traditional religious denomination's tendency to be more focused on defensive imperatives.

In light of Russians' current dispositions, the influence of a religious worldview on understanding threats may be viewed as the interpretation of Russia's sustainability as a civilization through the prism of social, cultural, and religious parameters. Even though Russians' opinions are dominated by the notion that threats mostly come from an external source, the majority is still inclined to feel anxious about threats having a negative social and economic impact within the country, while the danger posed by religious extremism on a global level is pushed to the periphery. On the other hand, Russian society is deeply troubled by potential conflicts between different religious groups, which heightens the perception of threats to social stability. In this context, it becomes clear that the followers of Russia's major religions share the same opinions, which confirms that dialogue between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia has a substantial foundation.

As studies have shown, the religious factor does not influence the choice of either short- or long-term social strategies, thus passing unnoticed by the public consciousness as either a reason for tension or the path of salvation. At the same time, the religious factor is multifaceted in nature, which is demonstrated through different attitudes towards the rise in activity of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as through different opinions on the social role of religious organizations and different individual displays of faith. In some cases, this serves as definite proof of there being significant worldview differences in society, in terms of «the religious vs the secular»; whereas in other cases, this clearly shows that the attitudes towards religious organizations' social activity and usefulness are a sign of society's autonomy, which before now has not been undermined even by religious institutions. Overall, the conclusion would be as follows: as people search for ways to reduce the negative impact of growing social tension, the subjective importance of turning to God continues to grow.

Russians' evaluation of interreligious relations in society confirms the convergence of ethnic and religious traditions as the basis of community life in Russia, while also reflecting the challenges faced by social stability and value-based integrity. Despite the almost complete lack of destructive open confrontation scenarios in the public's evaluations, around one-third of Russians still admit that there is a covert threat of ethnic and religious tension.

Social stability and shared values largely depend on the way followers of different religions and worldview principles interact with one another. The emotional, historical, and prediction aspects show that there are major shared vectors in people's opinions, and the differences that do arise have little to do with religion. Having different outlooks on life and religious preferences does not disrupt the symbolic continuity of the country's history and values, but still sheds light on the current risks. What we mean here is a slight drop in the share of positive attitudes towards being filled with patriotism, the interpretation of the «Russian question», and balancing multiple religions and ethnicities as a value-centric and political phenomenon.

At the same time, as we analyze the value-based historical projections and the images of the desired future, we do not see any grave contradictions in the opinions of different religions' followers, which goes to show that shared history and values provide a solid foundation. And even though a design for Russia's religious development is not among the top priorities in the public consciousness, just as purely religious or ecclesiastical historical symbols do not define the Russian people's heritage, the concepts of

“the Church» and «Faith» are currently of great importance, as they play an important role in maintaining social stability.

Analysis of the life priorities of Russians in the IS RAS project reveals that the focus on individualism, personal well-being, and self-fulfillment continues to be relevant, and has even gained more prevalence during the crisis. In contrast, the desire to interact with the outside world and different types of communities, as well as the wish to work as a team, remains less relevant. Russians' perception of the new reality is dominated by a diminished sense of security, a more vehement desire to fight against glaring social inequality, and a readiness to make independent decisions and act responsibly. Unlike people living in other European countries, Russians view financial well-being and the respect of fellow community members not as a life goal in itself but rather as the flip side of the scarcity of these life aspects. Their perception of the country's development prospects, in turn, is dominated by striving for stability and returning to tradition.

It is very important to emphasize that modern Russians do not view tradition as something archaic; on the contrary, for them tradition is something that lives on during different historical periods and is upheld by certain social groups because it is reasonable, practical, and essential from a spiritual and moral point of view. During the current crisis, just like during the years before, Russian society has been exhibiting an inclination towards reviewing a number of key values, with no less than one-third of the population using tradition as guidance on a consistent (or we can say systemic) basis. Interestingly enough, this process, with all its internal divergence of sociopolitical dispositions, is typical of all population groups, including the representatives of various ethnicities.

It is worth noting that the share of the population that gives more weight to the current reality rather than tradition (primarily when it comes to the issues and principles of everyday life) stably declines with age, while reaching a maximum in the age cohort that is not too concerned about having to adapt to the crisis. Similarly, adherence to tradition takes prevalence with age (especially among people aged 60 or older) even in the economically active cohorts, where the share of those who uphold traditions is normally far below average.

It would be logical to assume that advocates of traditional views support the development of Russia as an authoritarian state. On the other hand, those people who systemically support modern values mostly hail the development of democracy (with a European accent). We must note that this group is also more likely to attract those who have not yet taken a definite stance on the matter (the «midway» group). However,

our research has also revealed a reverse, even paradoxical, trend. When it comes to choosing Russia's main development path, the midway group is more inclined to support the idea of Russia going its own way, which is very strongly advocated by traditionalists (as opposed to following the «European way»).

What is the reason behind this paradox? It could lie in the latest events that have been occurring in Europe, which have almost completely erased its reputation as a civilization with a balanced culture; as a result, using the term «European» when talking of social development prospects causes an idiosyncratic reaction in terms of both emotions and political ideas.

It is quite evident that, just like all other people on Earth, Russians strive towards prosperity, modern comforts, higher quality of life, and greater well-being. However, they are not focused on the goal alone; the means of reaching it are just as important. They value not only material prosperity but also the conceptual side of well-being. In this respect, the IS RAS research group saw once more that Russians' social attitude cannot be called purely material in nature; it also includes a certain concept of self-respect based on the desire to be an achiever as well as on values that stem from the idea of education and enlightenment. And this interest is linked to the way Russians see themselves and, as a result, gets intertwined with the issue of identity, and ultimately with an inherent national worldview. That's why the «proper», «successful» modernization of the country, as Russians see it, will occur when Russia will be able to earn money not only thanks to its mineral resources, infrastructure, or strategically advantageous geographical location, but also due to the intellect of its people.

Attempts to think about Russia's future help reveal one of the most prominent peculiarities of the Russian mentality, i.e. the close connection, merging even, between a strong inclination towards modernization and the traditionalist point of view. While being obsessed with scientific and technical progress, Russian society is still deeply rooted in tradition. That said, Russians' tendency to support tradition is rational in nature. This allows us to make significant adjustments to the familiar notion that the behavioral patterns of modern Russians are based on the ideas of collectivism and individualism. As convincingly demonstrated by the scientific monitoring of the transformation processes in Russian society (including, but not limited, to the research carried out by IS RAS), Russians are no less individualistic than many citizens of developed countries. The social history of Russia over the past fifty years has been inextricably intertwined with the mass motivation to transition

to a “consumer society», and thus may be regarded as the history of individualistic values and of the way they developed and asserted themselves. It is evident that the crises that modern Russia has had to live through have not «dulled down» this trend; on the contrary, they have made it even more relevant.

As the system of cultural norms and values drifts from collectivism to individualism, we can distinguish two opposing worldview models: activism and passivity. The followers of the first model, dubbed “super activists» in IS RAS studies, are characterized by a high level of civic involvement and a strong sense of responsibility. Those who adhere to the second model, the so-called «everymen», tend to have a more inert and superficial stance on life.

According to the results of this monitoring, super activists are very committed to being self-sufficient, standing up for themselves, and finding new things to learn. The everymen, on the other hand, tend to rely heavily on government support and exhibit conservatism and even sycophancy. There are also respondents that can be described as the «middle» group, characterized by a combination of active and passive attitudes.

Interpretation of the results of our project gives us reason to believe that in today’s Russia, the model of success revolves around a single person and the way they build and protect their financial «castle», and does not extend to the greater part of society or an attempt to incite social changes. The only difference between the way this model is reproduced by various generations is that young people (naturally, not all of them) are removed from the «community» vision of success even further than middle-aged or senior groups. It is noteworthy, however, that while super activists rarely speak of unity, teamwork, or solidarity, they get involved in the community far more often than the everymen, who declare their commitment to the community and social priorities from the comfort of their home, without taking practical action.

The data we have collected **in the course of the monitoring waves carried out in 2014–2016** allows us to say that there have been two parallel sets of reasons that doubled the number of the poor during the crisis. On the one hand, this rise in poverty was caused by «optimization» of the Russian economy on the whole and industrial enterprises in particular, which resulted in the least efficient yet qualified workers (mostly male) being made redundant. On the other hand, the steep rise in prices combined with stagnant wages (which mostly remained at a rather low level), drove many people whose income had just recently slightly exceeded the minimum wage (i.e. people barely above the poverty threshold) into poverty by the end of the first crisis year.

The monitoring data have also proved that the state institutions responsible for the social well-being of the community were not prepared to reduce the risk of widespread mass poverty during the crisis. On the state policy level, poverty continues to be viewed as, first and foremost, an issue related to social benefits, not employment. Today's crisis has shed light on just how wrong this perception, just like the approach to fighting national poverty, is.

The Russian middle class, in turn, has not been diminished or driven into extinction by the consequences of existing in crisis conditions (contrary to popular belief). At the same time, their overall influence on the economy has manifested itself through negative trends in the economic situation and employment of the middle strata of society, which go back to the years before the crisis. We may observe that people in this category, who were enjoying quite a comfortable lifestyle at the end of the 2000s, have started to gradually lose their privileges, despite there still being a sizable gap between them and the rest of the population. At that, the Russian middle class has been most adversely impacted by the deterioration of social support at work, the increase in prices, being forced to cut down on the use of paid social services and take on extra work of every type, and the resulting shortage of free time.

But even so, the actual negative impact of the crisis on the middle class proved to be much smaller than anticipated. As a consequence, the size of the middle class remained the same (42–44%) and only a small share of the middle class believed that they were now worse off than before the crisis. As before, the dominating idea was that one had to solve one's problems on one's own, and the daily coping practices in hard times were usually based on rational strategies.

Even though many Russians are not satisfied with the state of nearly all essential aspects of society's existence, as well as (based on the most widespread opinions) with their inability to directly influence authorities, they nevertheless continue putting their trust in the government and do not support any forms of deposing government leaders. The transition of the situation in the country from crisis to post-crisis at the end of 2016 reflects a certain balance between the interests and capabilities of the state and society. At the same time, the relations between the two entities are growing more rational, influenced by the specific interests and actions of those involved. On the one hand, this creates objective prerequisites for developing state and community institutions, and on the other, it draws more attention to the issue of balancing the rational and value-based components of Russian society's consolidation.

On the whole, analysis of the project results gives us reason to believe that during the current crisis in Russia, the system of norms and values typical of “neo-etacritic» societies continues to be dominant and sustainable. The core of any such system is the special role of the state. However, is far from being a sign of society longing for authoritarian rule and, moreover, for a totalitarian regime. On the contrary, what we may observe here is the image of society as the «Dominion», which has always been a feature of Russian culture. According to this concept, the state is inseparable from society, which, in turn, grants the government the right to protect the people. Most Russians believe that turning this model into reality requires complete solidarity within the community and willingness to help those who are not as successful or have fallen on hard times. This perception of society and patriotic devotion to the «Dominion» is spread among the overwhelming majority of Russians (as opposed to a limited number of specific social groups). The concept of the «Dominion» is linked to the sense of unity and the feeling that every person is part of a greater whole, the existence of which relies on sharing the same worldview and basic norms and values.

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В книге подведены итоги реализованного в 2014–2016 гг. социологического мегапроекта, эмпирической базой которого стали пять «волн» общенациональных исследований, проведенных в режиме мониторинга. Приведен сопоставительный анализ данных, характеризующих в контексте различных общественных ситуаций состояние и динамику массового сознания и поведения россиян в условиях кризиса. Выделяются ситуативные, динамичные и базисные, устойчивые внутренние и внешние факторы жизнестойкости российского социума с учетом реального социально-экономического, политического, социокультурного и этнорелигиозного контекстов.

Для социологов, политологов, философов, экономистов, историков, психологов, правоведов, а также студентов и аспирантов соответствующих специальностей.

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