DIVIDING THE ARCTIC. (110,00 руб.)

Waling T. Gorter ( cand.polit.) The Northen (Arctic) Satet University, Longyearbyen, Svalbard, Norway Arkhangelsk, Russia Dividing the Arctic: The Soviet Liberation of Eastern Finnmark, the new Soviet-Norwegian land border at the onset of the Cold War and the Russian-Norwegian Bilateral Agreement on Maritime Delimitation of 27th April 2010 on ‘borders’ /’dividing lines’ at Sea in the Barents Sea and in the Arctic Ocean after the end of the Cold War. <...> The first part of this paper deals with the events in October 1944 when the Soviet Union liberated the first part of Norway: Eastern Finnmark. <...> In the second part of this paper we will deal with what happened when 27th April 2010 the Norwegian-Russian ‘border lines’ at sea were defined: instead of talking about disputed areas there is now an agreement on a delimitation line. <...> I. The Soviet liberation of Eastern Finnmark and the new Soviet-Norwegian land border 1944 of the Great Patriotic War was characterized by ”Stalin’s blows” which brought soviet troops to the Western border and led to the liberation of Soviet territory. <...> Its first result was the liberation of the Soviet Polar Area, then the Finnish Petsamo District and finally Northern Norway. <...> However during the preparation of the final and 3rd stage, the liberation of Eastern Finnmark, a strange halt was made in front of the national border with Norway. <...> This stop 1 lasted for nearly three days and gave German forces a unique opportunity to complete the evacuation of equipment, food and fuel by sea from Kirkenes. <...> Nothing was left there when Soviet forces finally arrived there the 25th of October. <...> However, were more important reasons for this too: Crossing the border of an allied demanded co-ordination with other allies in the coalition. <...> Crossing Norwegian borders with Soviet troops was put on halt for 3 days because it was one of the subjects of these negotiations with Churchill. <...> If necessary this liberation of a part of Norway and with Soviet troops standing on Norwegian soil, could later be used to put pressure on the allied countries in connection with decisions about the post war destiny of both Eastern European and Asian countries. <...> One may assume (the very most delicate topics of discussion are rarely noted down in protocols), that Churchill didn’t <...>